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Abstract
This paper considers the role of foreign investors in developed-country equity
markets. It presents a quantitative model of trading that is built around two new as-
sumptions: (i) both the foreign and domestic investor populations contain investors
of diﬀerent sophistication, and (ii) investor sophistication matters for performance
in both public equity and private investment opportunities. The model delivers a
uniﬁed explanation for three stylized facts about US investors’ international equity
trades: (i) trading by US investors occurs in bursts of simultaneous buying and
selling, (ii) Americans build and unwind foreign equity positions gradually and
(iii) US investors increase their market share in a country when stock prices there
have recently been rising. The results suggest that heterogeneity within the foreign
investor population is much more important than heterogeneity of investors across
countries.
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The role of foreign investors in ﬁnancial markets is an important unresolved issue in in-
ternational ﬁnance. Does participation of foreigners destabilize a stock market, or does
it make that market more eﬃcient? Or does participation of foreigners not really change
how the market operates? An answer to these questions must take a stand on motives for
trade, and hence on how investors diﬀer. Existing literature on international equity mar-
kets argues that cross-country heterogeneity of investors is important: foreign investors
are homogenous, but they know less about domestic stocks than local investors. This
paper reconsiders the link between diﬀerences in investor sophistication and international
equity ﬂows using a dynamic general equilibrium model that is calibrated to data from
the G7 countries.
We make two new assumptions. First, we allow for within-country diﬀerences in
investor sophistication. This assumption is particularly suitable for modern industrial-
country stock markets, where the best (and worst) foreign and local traders tend to have
very similar backgrounds and skills. It is also supported by recent empirical studies on
individual trading behavior and performance.1 Our second assumption is that sophisti-
cation is not only reﬂected in better information about stocks, but also in higher ability
to locate oﬀ-market private investment opportunities. This is in the spirit of Merton’s
(1987) investor recognition hypothesis: some investors scan the economy more carefully
for investment opportunities than others. Sophisticated investors should thus not only
be better at market research, but they should also be more likely to ﬁnd good deals oﬀ
the stock market that are not recognized by other investors.
Under these assumptions, asking about the role of foreign investors is essentially
asking whether within-country or cross-country diﬀerences in sophistication are more
important. To provide a quantitative answer, we construct a model of the stock market
in a small open economy, with both types of heterogeneity present. We then calibrate
this model to quarterly data on dividends, returns, volume, and US investors’ aggregate
gross and net trades in the G7 countries. Our main ﬁnding is that within-country het-
erogeneity is much more important than cross-country heterogeneity.W e d o ﬁnd that
foreign and domestic investor populations diﬀer: in line with previous literature, the
average US-based participant in a foreign market appears somewhat less sophisticated
than the average local participant. However, for all countries, a model that matches the
data well must have the property that cross-country diﬀerences between average trades
1We provide a detailed review of the literature in Section 2.
1are much smaller than within-country diﬀerences between trades of sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors.
We verify that our calibrated models account for key stylized facts on the joint dis-
tribution of quarterly equity ﬂows and returns. In particular, our approach delivers a
uniﬁed explanation for two regularities that are prominent in the empirical literature.
On the one hand, it generates realistic amounts of ﬂow momentum — persistence in net
purchases of foreign equity by US investors. In all G7 country stock markets, Americans
build and unwind foreign positions gradually: a net purchase of foreign equity by US
investors in some quarter predicts further net purchases at least over the following 2
quarters. On the other hand, net ﬂows exhibit return chasing — both current and lagged
local stock returns are positively correlated with current net purchases by US investors,
normalized by foreign market capitalization. US investors thus chase returns: when they
see foreign stock prices increase, they buy foreign shares from local investors.
Persistence and return chasing are both facts about net equity ﬂows, the series that
existing literature has focused on. Net ﬂows are due to cross-country heterogeneity.
Within-country heterogeneity matters for gross ﬂows. To see this, consider a shock that
makes sophisticated investors buy shares from unsophisticated investors. This shock
will generate a burst of simultaneous buying and selling by the population of Americans,
which contains members of both groups. Within-country heterogeneity thus induces sub-
stantial positive contemporaneous correlation in US investors’ aggregate gross purchases
and sales of foreign equity. We document this new stylized fact for all G7 countries.
To see how our model accounts for the stylized facts, it is helpful to ﬁrst clarify why
investors trade. One motive for trade is risk sharing.P a y o ﬀs from private opportunities
tend to be high in booms, when stock prices also rise. As a result, sophisticated investors
who ﬁnd good opportunities will try to sell stocks to share business cycle risk with
unsophisticated investors. The second motive for trade is disagreement about expected
stock returns. Disagreement occurs in equilibrium because stock prices do not reveal
all of sophisticated investors’ information. Some of this information is about the local
business cycle. However, there are also signals about expected private returns that are
orthogonal to the local business cycle. Unsophisticated investors cannot tell whether
stock prices move because of business cycle information or because of other signals that
are only relevant for private opportunities.
Now consider the beginning of a typical boom in our small open economy. As good
news about the business cycle arrives, all investors update their assessment of future
cash ﬂows and stock prices begin to rise. At the same time, sophisticated investors
2increasingly locate proﬁtable oﬀ-market opportunities. To exploit private opportunities
without unduly increasing exposure to business cycle risk, they begin to sell stocks. With
heterogeneous investor populations, this generates both volume and, in international
data, a burst of gross trading activity. Moreover, since the average American is less
sophisticated than the average local investor, the US population is buying foreign stocks
as prices are rising.
The above risk-sharing trades are slowed down by disagreement: unsophisticated
investors who have less information about the state of the business cycle are initially less
optimistic and will only buy stocks at a discount. However, a string of favorable returns
can help convince them that a boom is under way. This predictably leads to more net
purchases by unsophisticated investors and hence more net purchases by Americans. In
contrast, sophisticated investors sell more and more stocks as the peak of the boom
is approached. Only as the economy weakens and proﬁtable private opportunities dry
up do sophisticated investors return to the market. Again, the transition is slow as
unsophisticated investors, who were overly optimistic at the peak, gradually revise their
opinion.
The calibrated models do a good job in matching the autocorrelation functions of US
investors’ net purchases in the diﬀerent countries.2 Indeed, the models predict not only
ﬂow momentum (positive autocorrelation at short horizons of 1-3 quarters), but also
ﬂow reversal, that is, negative autocorrelation at longer horizons (5-7 quarters). This
prediction derives from business cycle swings in trading — momentum and reversal are also
features of the persistent component of dividends. In the data, there is strong evidence
for ﬂow reversal in Canada, France and Germany, and somewhat weaker evidence for
Japan and Italy. By and large, the models also do a decent job for the cross-correlogram
of ﬂows and returns.
Return chasing is often cited as an example of irrational behavior by foreign investors.
This view was countered by Bohn and Tesar (1996) who constructed estimates of expected
local returns based on public information. They showed that American investors tend to
buy precisely when these expected returns are high. To further assess the performance of
our model, we replicate the Bohn-Tesar exercise in our model economies. We consistently
ﬁnd that the calibrated models also predict positive correlation between expected returns
conditional on public information and net purchases by US investors: the unsophisticated
foreign investors in our models. This provides further support for our model and for a
2The only exception is the UK. We suspect that this failure of the model is due to the importance of
L o n d o na sa ni n t e r n a t i o n a lﬁnancial center and the associated known problems with ﬂow data for the
UK. This is discussed further below.
3rational view of return chasing.
The ability of our model to match the dynamics of equity ﬂows relies on two features
that distinguish it from most other asymmetric information setups. First, there are
no noise traders. Many models use serially independent supply shocks as a device to
guarantee disagreement between traders in a rational expectations equilibrium. The
ﬁrst diﬀerence of these supply shocks is interpreted as noise trades. However, the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of a serially independent process is a negatively autocorrelated MA(1) process.
By construction, noise trades are thus reversed after one period. This implies that they
induce negative serial correlation in net purchases, a fact not observed in the data.
In contrast, in our model disagreement arises from an interplay of imperfect and
asymmetric information. The true state of the business cycle is not perfectly observed by
any investor. Since private opportunities are more proﬁtable in booms, a high realized
private return is a ‘good’ private signal about the business cycle, and hence about future
dividends on stocks. This induces positive correlation between unexpected private returns
and stock returns. As a result, sophisticated investors’ portfolio demand for stocks, and
hence stock prices, also depend on news about private opportunities that are orthogonal
to the business cycle. Unsophisticated investors are unable to distinguish such news
from business cycle shocks, which ensures disagreement. Since this mechanism relies on
the imperfect observation of persistent factors, it is consistent with persistent trading
activity.
Second, our model is based on fundamentals (the estimated dividend process) that
e x h i b i tm o m e n t u ma n dr e v e r s a l .I ti so f t e nt a k e nf o rg r a n t e dt h a ta s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a -
tion trivially generates serial correlation in ﬂows regardless of what fundamentals look
like. We show that this intuition is misleading: ﬂow momentum does not obtain when
t h es h o c k st h a tg e n e r a t et r a d er e v e r tt ot h em e a nt o oq u i c k l y .I no u rm o d e l ,ﬂow momen-
tum obtains because trades are driven by business cycle shocks that have a hump-shaped
impulse response function.3
The argument that asymmetric information produces ﬂow momentum is often made
in ﬁnite horizon models of dynamic trading. Suppose that, in such a model, informed and
uninformed investors initially disagree. Then there will typically be a string of trades in
3It is worth pointing out that the persistence of US net purchases, which can be positive or negative,
is harder to explain than the persistence of volume, which involves an absolute value. For example,
a sequence of iid noise trader holdings would induce persistent volume, but successive net trades by
investors would be negatively serially correlated. Similarly, the trading volume model of Wang (1994)
which is based on AR(1) fundamentals, generates persistent volume, but negative serial correlation in
ﬂows between investor types.
4the same direction, as disagreement is gradually resolved through learning by uninformed
investors. It thus appears that asymmetric information generates momentum in ﬂows.
However, this is only conditional momentum, given the initial disagreement. In the data,
what matters is unconditional momentum, reﬂected in the unconditional autocorrelation
of net purchases. When the latter is calculated in a model, it matters how the economy
reached the initial state of disagreement. If this occurs through a shock that quickly
reverts to the mean, trades are also quickly reversed in equilibrium, and there is negative
unconditional autocorrelation!
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3 presents the model of equity trading. Section 4 discusses the properties of equilibrium
stock ﬂows and returns. Section 5 discusses the data used in documenting the facts and in
the calibration. Section 6 presents the calibration and the quantitative results. Technical
details on detrending the data, estimating the dividend process and solving the model
are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
While there is a large empirical literature on the joint distribution of international equity
ﬂows and returns, there are relatively few theoretical studies (for a survey, see Stulz
1999.) We discuss both in turn.
Empirical Work
We document a strong positive contemporaneous correlation of gross purchases and
sales of US investors. This new stylized fact is important, because it rules out a large
class of models in international economics and ﬁnance in which representative agents
live in diﬀerent countries and trade country-stock indices with each other (or accumulate
aggregate capital stocks).4 T h ep r e v a l e n c eo fb u r s t so fg r o s st r a d i n ga c t i v i t ys u g g e s t s
that this highly aggregated view is not an appropriate way to think about capital ﬂows.
In our model, gross trading activity is instead explained by heterogeneity of investor
populations.
The two other stylized facts we emphasize, ﬂow momentum and return chasing, are
well known. Bohn and Tesar (1996) have documented persistence in the aggregate US
data that are also the basis for our calibration. Froot and Donohue (2002) have recently
4The only way for such models to be consistent with the ﬂow data would be a strong time aggregation
eﬀect. However, Albuquerque et al. (2003) document that positive correlation between gross purchases
and sales also exists at the monthly frequency.
5examined persistence in international trades by individual mutual funds. Their analysis
shows that the source of persistence in aggregate mutual fund investment is asynchronous
trading across funds into individual countries. This result highlights the role of investor
heterogeneity also emphasized in our model.
Bohn and Tesar (1996) ﬁrst pointed out the return chasing phenomenon. Their paper
documents positive contemporaneous correlation of ﬂows and return at the quarterly
frequency. Later work (Bohn and Tesar 1995, Brennan and Cao 1997, Choe et al. 1999,
Froot et al. 2001) has shown that a lot of the contemporaneous correlation over longer
p e r i o d si sd u et op o s i t i v ec o r r e l a t i o no fﬂows with lagged returns at higher frequencies.
Our model captures both features: there is contemporaneous correlation between ﬂows
and returns, and returns predict ﬂows. This suggests that the eﬀects we identify could
also be of interest for models calibrated to higher frequency data.
Evidence on investor heterogeneity comes from the literature on individual investor
performance. There now exists a large number of studies that use data on individual
trades to ask whether local investors outperform foreigners or vice versa. This litera-
ture has not been conclusive, with strong results in both directions, depending on the
time period and the data set used.5 This is what one would expect if there is indeed
within-country investor heterogeneity. In addition, some studies have provided direct
evidence on heterogeneity. In Finnish data, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) ﬁnd diﬀer-
ences in trading behavior and performance between domestic household investors and
domestic institutions. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2001) analyze the trading behavior of for-
eign investors (US and others) and domestic institutions and individuals around days of
signiﬁcant abnormal returns and days of large buying or selling activity in Korea. They
ﬁnd that foreign investors trade at worse prices relative to domestic individuals, but not
relative to domestic institutions.
Theoretical work
The structure of our model is similar to that in Wang’s (1994) seminal paper on
trading volume. In Wang’s model, some agents who obtain private information also
5For studies that suggest an advantage of domestic traders, see Frankel and Schmukler (1996) for
Mexico and Hau (2001) for Germany. Hamao and Mei (2001) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence that foreigners
are able to time the Japanese stock market. In contrast, Karolyi (1999) documents that foreign investors
outperform domestic investors in Japan. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) obtain the same result for
Finland. Seasholes (2000) ﬁnds that foreign investors in Taiwan systematically accumulate assets before
positive earnings announcements and systematically sell assets before negative earnings announcements.
Froot and Ramadorai (2001) show that unexpected inﬂows into closed-end funds cause an increase in
the prices of both the net asset value of the fund and that of the fund itself, indicating that foreign
investors have signiﬁcant private information.
6invest in a private asset. While the expected returns on the private asset are perfectly
observed by informed investors and independent of dividends, a non-revealing rational
expectations equilibrium obtains if dividends are correlated with unexpected returns on
the private asset. In contrast, our model relies on imperfect information by all investors
and on a more general factor structure required to match the data. This gives rise to a
diﬀerent argument for nonrevelation, as discussed above.
There are many models of foreign equity holdings, in particular of equity home bias
(for a survey, see Lewis 1999.) However, the theoretical literature on ﬂows is relatively
recent. To our knowledge, there is no prior theoretical work on gross ﬂows and their
connection to volume and net ﬂows. Brennan and Cao (1997) started the literature on
net ﬂows. They emphasized the contemporaneous correlation of net ﬂows and returns.
In their model, foreign investors are less informed than domestic investors. This not
only generates home bias, but it also implies that foreign investors react more to pub-
lic information. If private information accumulates slowly, their model predicts positive
contemporaneous correlation of foreigners’ net purchases and returns, as in the data.
The overreaction eﬀect stressed by Brennan and Cao is also present in our model: unso-
phisticated investors mistake a temporary shock to dividends for a persistent shock and
become net buyers. However, since this type of shock is temporary, it is quickly reversed
and contributes negatively to the autocorrelation of ﬂows. For our calibrated models,
variance decompositions show that this limits the contribution of temporary dividend
shocks relative to the persistent business cycle shocks discussed above.
Brennan and Cao (1997) do not analyze the ﬂow dynamics implied by their model.
Similarly, Coval (1999), who studies a quantitative two-country model with asymmet-
rically informed investors does not use his model to consider any of the stylized facts
we look at. Hau and Rey (2002) develop a model of international equity ﬂows in the
presence of exchange rate risk and a price-elastic supply of foreign exchange according
to which a Euro appreciation (say relative to the US dollar) decreases the excess supply
of euros. Their model does well in explaining correlations between currency and equity
returns. However, it fails to deliver positive contemporaneous correlation between for-
eign investors’ net purchases and local returns. This is because foreign investors sell local
equities when local equity returns are high, but local currency returns are low. Griﬃne t
al. (2002) study a two-country model to explain the daily behavior of ﬂows and returns
in emerging markets. They generate return chasing by assuming that foreigners have
what they call ‘extrapolative expectations’. They argue that such expectations could be
caused by irrational or updating behavior. In our model, the rational expectations of
7unsophisticated investors endogenously have the ‘extrapolative’ property. As described
above, this rational return chasing implies that our model is also consistent with the
fact that foreign investors’ net purchases are positively correlated with expected returns
conditional on public information as measured by econometricians.
3 The Model
In this section, we ﬁrst present a model of a small open economy in which sophisti-
cated and unsophisticated investors trade stocks. We then derive expressions for various
statistics of trading activity when investors belong to two heterogeneous populations
identiﬁed by nationality. In particular, the population of US investors will contain both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.
3.1 Setup
Preferences
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived investors. A fraction νU o fi n v e s t o r si su n -
sophisticated (indexed by U), while a fraction 1 − νU is sophisticated (indexed by S).
Investors have identical expected utility preferences that exhibit constant absolute risk

















where β<1 i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,γ>0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and
Ii
t is the information set at time t,t ob es p e c i ﬁed below.
Investment Opportunities
There are three assets that are available to all investors. First, a risk-free bond pays
a constant gross rate of return of Rf. Second, a risky “world asset” pays a simple excess
return of RW
t in period t. Third, all investors participate in the domestic stock market.
The single asset traded in this market is a claim to the dividend stream {Dt}.A td a t et,
s h a r e st r a d ea tap e r - s h a r ee x - d i v i d e n dp r i c eo fPt, and hence deliver a per-share excess
return of RD
t = Pt + Dt − RfPt−1. A single share is traded every period. A fourth
asset is accessible to sophisticated investors alone; we refer to it as a private investment
opportunity and denote its simple excess return by RB
t .
8Dividends and asset returns are subject to both persistent and transitory shocks. Let
FD
t denote the persistent component of dividends. Returns on private opportunities are
predictable, and the expected return is correlated with dividends. Other ﬂuctuations
in the expected return on the private opportunity are summarized by a state variable
FB
t ,i n d e p e n d e n to fFD
t ,t h a tw el a b e lt h e“ o ﬀ-market factor.” Both state variables can








of dividends and returns is summarized by:





















Ft = ρFt−1 + ε
F
t . (5)
Bold-faced letters denote vectors and matrices, and variables with bars denote uncondi-










that is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and covariance






are block diagonal and εF
t is
uncorrelated with all other shocks. The shock ε
y
t is described below.
Information
At date t, all investors know past and present stock prices and dividends as well as







l=0. Sophisticated investors not only know IU
t , but they
also observe: (i) past and present returns on their private opportunities; (ii) the factor
FB




t about the persistent component of dividends, where
ε
y
t is uncorrelated with all other shocks. All sophisticated investors observe the same









































































t denote the number of
9local stocks held by sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, respectively. Investor i
chooses contingent plans for consumption {ci
l}
∞







expected utility (1), conditional on the information set Ii
t and the budget constraint (6).
Equilibrium










for consumption, asset holdings and the domestic stock price such that: (i) both types




t +( 1− νU)θ
S
t =1 . (7)
A key feature of this equilibrium is that agents look at current and past prices to update
their beliefs about variables they do not observe. In particular, unsophisticated investors
will try to learn from prices about the return on private opportunities and the signal yS
t
received by sophisticated investors about the persistent component of dividends.
International Equity Flows
To apply the model to data on US investors’ trades in international markets, we
assume that there are two investor nationalities: US investors, who have accounts in the
US, and local investors. The US and local populations both contain sophisticated and
unsophisticated types. Let ν∗ denote the measure of US investors and let ν∗
U denote
the fraction of unsophisticated US investors relative to all US investors. Aggregate US
















Trade is only due to the heterogeneity of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.
The market clearing condition (7) thus implies that we can write all relevant statistics
in terms of the holdings or trades of just one type. We choose to express everything in
terms of unsophisticated investors’ holdings. For example, US holdings of local equities



















Our model diﬀers from standard small open-economy models, in that the expected
return on the domestic stock market is endogenous, while the riskless rate, the world asset
10return and the return on the oﬀ-market asset are taken as exogenous. In other words,
we do not assume that there is one (exogenous) pricing kernel that can be used to price
all assets. The simplest way to interpret our setup is that there is market segmentation.
The domestic market is used by domestic investors as well as by a subset of US investors
who are themselves small relative to the US market. The world asset (the US stock
market index, say) is priced by the majority of US investors who do not participate in
the country under consideration.
Our approach thus assumes that equity home bias exists, and that it exists because
of limited American participation in foreign markets. Our goal here is not to explain the
world distribution of holdings of all assets, but trades in the stock market under con-
sideration, conditional on home bias. We thus only model participants in that market
explicitly. We also make the simplifying assumption that the world return is unpre-
dictable and that shocks εW
t to the world return are independent of all other shocks in
εt. This assumption is counterfactual for industrial countries, and it could be relaxed
to accommodate a common factor in returns and fundamentals.6 H o w e v e r ,w h i l ei ti s
not clear that this extension is important for the properties of ﬂows we are interested in
here, the mechanisms stressed below would still be present in the richer model. More-
over, Bohn and Tesar (1996) document that there is only a weak relationship between
US investors’ international equity ﬂows and US equity returns, which suggests that our
mechanism would still be ﬁrst order for ﬂows.
We have referred to the fourth asset broadly as “private investment opportunities”.
These opportunities (i) become available to a subset of market participants that is also
well-informed about the market itself; and (ii) are too costly to observe and access for
all other market participants. Examples of such opportunities are private equity, real
estate, foreign exchange or derivatives markets. Importantly, our story does not require
that the type of opportunity always be the same. All that matters is that, from time to
time, the well-informed part of the population discover some new way to invest that is
not known to everybody.
Lack of knowledge by unsophisticated investors has several possible interpretations.
One possibility is that the private opportunity is secret. More generally, one can think
of unsophisticated investors as people who only concentrate on a subset of the available
public information. Even though in principle there may be data on the latest investment
opportunity that sophisticated investors exploit, unsophisticated investors, who are not
6See Dumas et al. (2002) for a model of world stock returns and output that emphasizes cross-country
correlation.
11sure where to look, prefer to focus just on stock market information that they know
how to process. In our model, they process this information optimally: they know the
stochastic processes for prices and update their beliefs by Bayes’ rule. The ability of
sophisticated investors to recognize investment opportunities that are not readily (or
costlessly) available to unsophisticated investors is also present in Merton (1987) and
Shapiro (2002).
An important feature of our setup is that sophisticated investors have better infor-
mation about the persistent component of dividends. Sophisticated investors are thus
agents who are better at analyzing medium-term prospects. An alternative assumption
w o u l dh a v eb e e nt oa l l o wt h es i g n a lt od e p e n do nf u t u r ed i v i d e n d s . I nt h a tc a s e ,t h e
signal would not only provide information about the long-run path of dividends, but also
about short-term ﬂuctuations in dividends. More trades based on private information
would exist as sophisticated investors mistakenly responded to short run ﬂuctuations in
dividends, inducing more negative serial correlation in ﬂows. In our calibration below, we
decompose our estimated dividend process into a persistent and a transitory component.
The precision of the signal yS
t then regulates the knowledge of sophisticated investors
relative to unsophisticated investors on the persistent component.
3.2 Stationary Equilibria
Let ˆ Fi
t = E [Ft|Ii
t] denote investor i0s conditional expectation of the vector Ft that drives
persistent movements in fundamentals. Since IU
t ⊂ IS








. In other words, ˆ FU
t is the unsophisticated investors’ expecta-
tion of what sophisticated investors expect Ft to be. We focus on equilibria in which the
price can be written as a linear function of these expectations:









for some constants ¯ π, πS,a n dπU.
Theorem 1 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium such that the price satisﬁes
(9). Equilibrium prices and asset holdings are stationary. Investor i0s equilibrium stock
holdings take the form
θ
i





The equilibrium has two important properties. First, equilibrium prices do not reﬂect
the true values of the persistent components of dividends or private returns, but only
12investors’ perceptions of them. In contrast, in Wang (1994) some investors have full
information. Second, holdings of both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors only
depend on unsophisticated investors’ estimates of the persistent factors ˆ FU
t .T r a d i n go f
sophisticated investors thus diﬀers from trading of unsophisticated investors because of
the weights placed on each of these factors. We return to this below.
We now sketch the main argument for the theorem, while a complete proof is relegated
to the appendix. Consider ﬁrst the agents’ payoﬀ-relevant information. Suppose the
information sets Ii
t contain only normal random variables. This implies normality of the
conditional expectations ˆ Fi
t, and, if the price satisﬁes (9), also of all per-share returns.





t , ˆ FU0
t
´0
is a suﬃcient statistic for forecasting all future returns,




t = ˆ FU
t is a suﬃcient statistic for forecasting returns given the information
set IU
t . This includes one-step-ahead returns, since the current price can be written as a
function of ˆ FU
t . Indeed, unsophisticated investors know ˆ FU
t ,s ot h a to b s e r v i n gt h ep r i c e
i st h es a m ea so b s e r v i n gt h es i g n a l
y
U
























t . It follows that the state vector φ
i
t captures the payoﬀ-relevant information
of investor i0s consumption-savings and portfolio choice problem.
An important feature of exponential utility is that optimal portfolios are independent
of wealth and linear in the agents’ state vector. The coeﬃcients θ
i
and Θi will typically
depend on the distribution of the exogenous variables as well as the price coeﬃcients
¯ π,πU and πS. The equilibrium condition requires that the price coeﬃcients satisfy:
νU¯ θ
U +( 1− νU)¯ θ
S =1
νUΘ
U +( 1− νU)Θ
S = 0.
Finding an equilibrium thus boils down to solving a nonlinear system of equations in the
price coeﬃcients.
4 Characterizing Equilibrium Flows and Returns
In this section, we derive some properties of equilibria analytically. We ﬁrst discuss
how beliefs evolve and why disagreement can persist in equilibrium. We then establish
properties of stock prices. Finally, we calculate statistics that we use below to calibrate
the model and evaluate its account of the stylized facts.
134.1 The Evolution of Beliefs
In our model, investors continually learn about the state of the business cycle and the
availability of private opportunities from observing prices, dividends and private signals.
Since all state variables are normal and homoskedastic, the evolution of investors’ beliefs
can be described by tracking conditional expectations, using the Kalman ﬁlter. The
resulting equations clarify why disagreement can arise in equilibrium and how diﬀerent
agents over- or under-estimate shocks.
Filtering
Sophisticated investors learn about the state of the business cycle by observing divi-
dends, returns on their private opportunities as well as their private signal. They do not
learn from the price since they already know ˆ FS
t and hence ˆ FU
t . We collect their relevant
observables in a vector oS
t =
¡
Dt − ¯ D, yS
t ,R B
t − ¯ RB − ηBFB
t−1
¢







Note that because the world return RW
t is uncorrelated with everything else it does
not add any relevant information. Equations (5) and (11) form a state-space system.
Sophisticated investors’ conditional expectation of the state vector, ˆ FS





















where KS is a steady-state Kalman gain matrix. The matrix MoSε allows errors in the
observation equation (11) to be correlated with errors in the state equation (12).
Unsophisticated investors obtain valuable information from dividends as well as from
the signal yU
t contained in prices, so that oU
t =
¡
Dt − ¯ D, yU
t
¢
. These variables7 can be











Equations (12) and (13) form the state space system of unsophisticated investors. Their
conditional expectation, and hence their state variable φ
U
t ,c a nb ew r i t t e na s
ˆ F
U









































, where e1 is the ﬁr s tu n i tv e c t o r .
14Finally, the law of motion of sophisticated investors’ state variable φ
S
t is summarized by
(12) and (14).
Non-revealing Prices
Since the stock price acts as a signal, the information structure in the model is endoge-
nous. We say that investors agree about the stock market if their conditional distributions
of future stock payoﬀsa r et h es a m e . 8 This is certainly true in the symmetric information
benchmark, where investors are assumed to agree on all state variables: ˆ FU
t = ˆ FS
t .H o w -
ever, agreement about the stock market could also arise endogenously in our asymmetric
information setup if prices were to reveal all relevant information about stocks.
Agreement about the stock market cannot occur in the linear equilibrium of Theorem
1. In our setup, equilibria are non-revealing, because (i) the sophisticated investor does
not perfectly observe the business cycle component FD
t , and (ii) the expected private
return depends on FD
t . Private returns RB
t are a signal of the state of the business cycle
and surprise changes in RB











t−1 . Because prices depend (at least) on these variables, sophisticated investors must
perceive unexpected returns on stocks and private opportunities as correlated.9 This




With a price that depends on both ˆ FD,S and ˆ FB,S, unsophisticated investors can-
not distinguish signals about the business cycle from signals relevant to private returns
only. Suppose initially agents were in agreement: ˆ FU
t−1 = ˆ FS
t−1. By (12), sophisticated
investors then update according to the 4-dimensional innovation vector ˆ ε
S
t . Unsophisti-







. For example, high prices could signal
either good news about dividends or bad news about private return opportunities.
Disagreement about the State of the Business Cycle









key determinants of equilibrium ﬂows and returns. The Kalman ﬁlter equations show
how these conditional expectations react to shocks. We say that an investor overreacts
(underreacts) to a shock if ˆ F D,i moves more (less) than the actual state variable FD.A s
8Agreement about the stock market is thus weaker than symmetric information. It already obtains
if ˆ F
D,U
t = ˆ F
D,S
t and the stock price is independent of ˆ FB,S and ˆ FB,U, even though unsophisticated
investors do not know about private returns (which are not relevant to them).
9Here we do not require correlation between dividend shocks and unexpected returns on private
opportunities under the true distribution. This is in contrast to Wang (1994), where this correlation is
key to obtaining nonrevelation. His model does not have the features (i) and (ii) stressed above.
15a general rule, inference about slow-moving state variables from data contaminated by
temporary noise induces overreaction to temporary shocks, but underreaction to persis-
tent shocks to the state variable. In our model, both types of investors have imperfect
information about FD and will thus overreact to εD
t and εB
t , but underreact to εFD
t .
With asymmetric information, shocks also induce disagreement. For example, con-
sider a positive shock εFD
t to the persistent component of dividends. The shock is re-
ﬂected in the dividend, which is observed by both investors. Sophisticated investors
obtain additional information about the shock from their private signal. Unsophisticated
investors, however, only see the indirect signal contained in the price. In a non-revealing
equilibrium, the indirect signal is contaminated by other shocks. Sophisticated investors
therefore underreact less: they end up underestimating FD
t by less than unsophisticated
investors. As a result, sophisticated investors become more optimistic. The opposite
result obtains in response to a positive temporary shock to dividends. In response to
such a shock, both investors see the dividend increase, but now sophisticated investors
do not see an unusual movement in their private signal. This causes them to assign lower
probability to the fact that FD
t has moved. As a result, unsophisticated investors become
more optimistic.
A positive persistent shock to private returns is fully observed by sophisticated in-
vestors. However, unsophisticated investors see only a noisy signal of the shock through
a lower stock price. Since the lower price could have been also caused by a negative busi-
ness cycle shock, unsophisticated investors end up underestimating the business cycle,
increasing disagreement. Finally, a temporary shock to private returns will generate a
noisy signal of the business cycle to sophisticated investors (as they observe the private
return) and to unsophisticated investors (as they observe the stock price move.) Such
a shock causes sophisticated investors to underestimate the business cycle by more if
unexpected shocks to dividends and private returns are positively correlated.
4.2 Optimal Portfolio Choice
The appendix solves investor i0s consumption and portfolio choice problem for i = U,S,
given the law of motion for φ
i




























where ˜ γ = γ (Rf − 1)/Rf. Risk averse investors not only care about ﬂuctuations in
wealth, but also about changes in beliefs, captured by the state vector φ
i
t.W i t h t h i s
value function, portfolio demand is linear in investors’ state variables.
16To gain intuition about equilibrium holdings and trades, let Xt+1 = Pt+1 + Dt+1



















distributions adjusted for agents’ taste of future large state variables (φ
i
t) are used for




















































The ﬁrst term in equations (16) and (17), often called myopic demand, captures responses
to changes in one-period-ahead expected excess returns. Unsophisticated investors’ my-
opic demand is simply proportional to expected per share stock returns. In contrast, as
long as stock and private returns are correlated, sophisticated investors’ myopic demand
also depends on expected private returns. In our numerical examples, stocks and private
opportunities are substitutes (ρS > 0) since they move together with the business cycle.
This tends to lower sophisticated investors’ demand for stocks.
T h es e c o n dt e r mi ne q u a t i o n s( 1 6 )a n d( 1 7 )r e ﬂects intertemporal hedging demand.
This demand is due to the investors’ concern with movements in the state variables φ
i
t.
Investor i eﬀectively behaves as if he was holding a portfolio of nontradable assets with
return vector φ
i
t+1. Under this interpretation, the time-varying vector of shares held in








. Since investors fear states of poor investment
opportunities, they favor assets that pay oﬀ in precisely these states: the average hedging
demand ¯ hi is particularly high for such assets. Moreover, since investors desire unusually
good opportunities, their exposure to a state variable increases if that state variable is




10More generally, with a vector of state variables, exposure to, say, the ﬁrst element increases if
complementary elements are expected to be high. Complementary elements are those for which the
product with the ﬁrst element yields high utility.
174.3 Equilibrium Prices, Predictability and Hedging
In our numerical results below, (i) the local stock price Pt depends strongly and posi-








, (ii) Pt depends









and (iii) considerations of intertemporal hedging are crucial to understand the behavior
of sophisticated investors, while they are largely irrelevant for unsophisticated investors.
These properties of the model are closely connected. To see this, it is helpful to ﬁrst
write Pt as a weighted average of two hypothetical stock prices PU
t and PS
t that would
arise in economies inhabited by only one type of agent.
Decomposition of the Stock Price
Using (16), (17) and the market clearing condition (7) for local stocks, we obtain:11
Pt =˜ νUP
U

















































t is the price in a representative-agent model with no private opportunities:
it equals the present discounted payoﬀ m i n u sar i s kp r e m i u m—t h ec o n s t a n tm y o p i cp r e -
mium βγσ2
U, less the intertemporal hedging demand. This suggests that t h ep r e s e n c eo f
unsophisticated investors reduces the time variation in risk premia. Indeed, since unso-
phisticated investors have no access to private opportunities, their hedging demand can
only come from predictability of excess local stock returns. If expected excess returns
are close to constant, the same is true for the hedging demand. The price can be deter-
mined by solving forward the equation for PU
t (with Xt = Dt+PU
t ). It follows that price
changes mostly reﬂect changes in the expected future dividends, and expected excess
returns must indeed be close to constant. This logic implies low predictability for an
actual representative-agent economy with unsophisticated investors. The result carries
over to our model if the number of unsophisticated investors is large enough.
The price PS
t is the price in an economy where all stockholders are entrepreneurs who
run a private business in addition to investing in the stock market. The risk premium
now contains an additional myopic component that depends on the time-varying expected
private return. Since the perceived correlation ρS of stock returns with private returns
11Of course, the payoﬀs and the distribution of the state variables would be diﬀerent in the hypothetical
representative-agent economies. The point here is that the structure of the price equations is the same.
18is positive in the equilibria we consider, this premium is also positive.12 Equation (18)
clariﬁes how predictability in private returns can spill over to the stock market to produce
time variation in expected stock returns.W i t hρS > 0, sophisticated investors who face
temporarily high expected private returns will want less exposure to business cycle risk
common to both assets, and hence demand higher risk premia on stocks. This also
explains why for them the relevant payoﬀ variance is only the portion that is orthogonal
to private returns, σ2
S (1 − ρ2
S). In addition, since entrepreneurs optimize dynamically,
their hedging demand depends on the correlation of stock returns with future investment
opportunities. This can further contribute to time variation in risk premia.
The weight ˜ νU on the unsophisticated price PU
t depends on the ability of unsophisti-
cated investors to move the market. Therefore, ˜ νU depends not only (positively) on the
number of unsophisticated participants, but also on their average stock holdings relative
to sophisticated investors. Relative holdings in turn are directly related to the rela-
tive precision of information about stock payoﬀs. If unsophisticated investors perceive
much more uncertainty about stocks (σ2
U >> σ2






U +( 1− νU)/σ2
S (1 − ρ2
S)
.
If information is symmetric and private returns are independent of stock returns, we have
˜ νU = νU. More generally, ˜ νU becomes larger as σ2
S/σ2
U rises and ρ2
S falls.
Stock-Price Variation and the Business Cycle
A simple thought experiment now shows why the business cycle state variables ˆ F
D,i
t
and ∆ ˆ F
D,i
t−1 are typically much more important for equilibrium stock price movements
and predictability than the orthogonal oﬀ-market factors FB
t and ∆FB
t−1 that only change
expected private returns. We conjecture properties for the price function for period t+1
that determine payoﬀs Xt+1 and then verify the same properties for the price Pt in (18).
Suppose that the future stock price Pt+1 depends positively on the perceived state of
the business cycle ˆ FDi
t as well as the perceived change ∆ ˆ FDi
t for i = U,S.S u p p o s ea l s o
that Pt+1 depends less, and negatively, on ˆ FBi




t today should also depend positively on ˆ F
D,i
t and ∆ ˆ F
D,i
t comes from the fact
that expected payoﬀsi nPi
t depend positively on ˆ F
D,i
t and ∆ ˆ F
D,i
t and that these factors
are persistent. However, there are three counteracting eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect comes from
12The literature on the equity premium has recently argued that ρS > 0 because private equity returns
are correlated with the business cycle. See, for example, Heaton and Lucas (2000).
19the risk premium in PU
t , if there is enough predictability of stock returns in equilibrium.
The other two eﬀects occur because a boom today also signals higher private returns
tomorrow, and increases sophisticated investors’ risk premium on local stocks (through
PS
t ). The risk premium increases via the myopic demand because of the substitutability
across assets and via a lower hedging demand because sophisticated investors’ exposure
to these state variables (which are positively correlated with stock returns) also increases.
Although these counteracting eﬀects exist, it is plausible that there are equilibria in which
they are outweighed by the present value eﬀect. This will certainly be true if the number
of unsophisticated investors is large enough.








on prices is limited by the fact that the
direct and the hedging demand eﬀect on the risk premium are oﬀsetting. Indeed, an
increase in ˆ F
B,S
t raises the risk premium since it increases the current expected private








implies that high current values
of these variables increase investors’ exposure to them in the future. Since they are
negatively correlated with stock returns, this increases the hedging demand for stocks
and reduces the risk premium. In all our calibrations, the direct eﬀect dominates so
that the negative dependence of prices on these factors is validated. However, the price
coeﬃcients are much smaller than for the business-cycle variables. Stock market booms
are thus essentially driven by expectations of future cash ﬂows. In particular, essentially
all predictability in equilibrium stock returns can be traced to business-cycle movements.
4.4 Equilibrium Flows and Returns
In this subsection, we decompose equilibrium trades into disagreement and risk sharing
components. We then show how these motives for trade impact key statistics of the joint
distribution of ﬂows and returns that speak to the stylized facts we are interested in.
Motives for Trade: Disagreement and Risk Sharing
Substituting expression (18) for the equilibrium stock price back into the portfolio
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20Trading volume and international equity ﬂows are thus driven by relative changes in the
two types’ valuations, captured by the hypothetical prices PU
t and PS
t .D i ﬀerences in
valuations arise for two reasons. The ﬁrst is simply disagreement about future payoﬀs:
unsophisticated investors are net buyers in periods when they become relatively more
optimistic than sophisticated investors.
Second, there is trade due to changes in the need for risk sharing. When sophisticated
investors perceive higher expected returns on private opportunities, they prefer to reduce
exposure to the business cycle. They thus sell the local asset, and unsophisticated in-
vestors buy. The eﬀect is not limited to the myopic demand for stocks: the intertemporal
hedging demand will typically also change. As discussed above, the key diﬀerences in
hedging needs across types arise precisely from the presence of private opportunities.
Flow Momentum, Reversal and Volatility
To examine ﬂow momentum and reversal, we calculate the autocorrelation function
of US investors’ net purchases of local equities. From (8), these net purchases are pro-





























The emergence of ﬂow momentum and ﬂow reversal in equilibrium is thus independent
of the population parameters: it depends only on the properties of trade across investor
types. In other words, the dynamics of US investors’ net purchases is characterized by
the disagreement and risk sharing motives.
However, the composition of investor populations matters for the volatility of ﬂows,
a fact that is used in our calibration strategy. The standard deviation of net purchases
is proportional to |ν∗














In the knife-edge case where the US population is a scaled version of the total population
(ν∗
U = νU), holdings of US investors are constant and net ﬂows are zero. Of course, there
can still be substantial gross ﬂows if the population of US investors is heterogeneous with
respect to investor sophistication.
21Return Chasing
We examine the relationship between ﬂows and returns in two ways. First, we con-
sider the cross-correlogram of US investors’ net purchases and local returns. By (20),
correlation of ﬂows and returns depends on population parameters only to the extent





















U >ν U, there are proportionately more unsophisticated investors in the
population of US international investors than in the local population. Holdings and net
purchases of US investors are then perfectly correlated with those of unsophisticated
investors. In contrast, when ν∗
U <ν U, US investors track sophisticated investors.
A second way to formally examine return chasing is to examine the risk premium
measured by an econometrician who constructs estimates of expected returns conditional
on public information. The econometrician will thus recover EU
t RD
t+1 which can then be
related to equilibrium trades (19).
Bursts of Gross Trading Activity
To determine properties of US investors’ gross trading activity, it is helpful to ﬁrst
calculate moments of aggregate trading volume in the local market. A natural measure
o fv o l u m ei st h et u r n o v e ro fs h a r e s .S i n c ee v e r yt r a d ei sa ne x c h a n g eo fs h a r e sb e t w e e n
the two types of investors, we can deﬁne trading volume as:









With normally distributed holdings, there are closed form expressions for the mean and












Gross purchases by US investors in period t are determined by which type of investor
is a net buyer during the period. Let 1∆θU
t >0 denote the indicator function for the event
that unsophisticated investors are net buyers, that is, ∆θ
U
t > 0. Mean gross purchases

































Mean gross purchases are thus proportional to mean volume. The model also predicts
that mean gross sales are equal to mean gross purchases, since the mean of net purchases
is zero.
225D a t a
In this section we describe the data and explain how they are compared to model output.
We focus on quarterly data from the G7 countries — apart from the US, these are Ger-
many, Japan, UK, France, Canada, and Italy — over the period 1977:1 through 2000:3.
We have selected these countries since they best ﬁt the assumptions of our model. First,
ﬂows and returns in these countries are likely to be driven by stable economic relation-
ships.13 In contrast, the on-going process of liberalization of equity markets in developing
countries may lead to capital ﬂows that are driven by changing risk-sharing opportunities
or declining transactions costs. In addition, the absence of trading frictions in our model
is more at odds with the institutional environment of emerging markets (for a survey of
emerging-markets ﬁnance, see Bekaert and Harvey 2003.)
5.1 Dividends
We use data on the dividend yield and the price index of Datastream’s international stock
market indices, with all variables converted to constant US dollars. Not surprisingly,
per-share dividends exhibit a trend. To obtain a stationary forcing process {Dt} for our
model, we follow Campbell and Kyle (1994) in removing an exponential trend. This
is described in detail in the Appendix, where we show that it is consistent with our
normalization of ﬂows, discussed below.
Table 1 presents key ﬁrst and second moments of detrended dividends. We have chosen
units such that the price index in 1977:1 equals market capitalization. Mean dividends
thus reﬂect the sizes of the diﬀerent stock markets. Strictly speaking, we assume that the
true dividend process follows a truncated normal distribution. The model approximates
this truth by modelling the dividend as normally distributed in levels. The table conﬁrms
that the approximation is very sensible as mean dividends are more than 3.5 standard
deviations above zero for all countries except Italy.
13While there has been some increase in correlation of stock index returns recently, Brooks and Del
Negro (2002) argue that this is a tenporary phenomnenon connected to an “IT bubble”, rather than a
permanent shift in market structure.
23Table 1. Summary Statistics of Dividends.
Country µ(D) σ(D) ρ1 (D)
CAN 4.89 0.34 0.93
FRA 2.19 0.47 0.96
GER 5.50 1.41 0.97
ITA 0.57 0.27 0.98
JAP 14.81 2.87 0.98
UK 12.91 2.23 0.92
US 91.51 3.61 0.90
NOTES: Mean µ, standard deviation σ and ﬁrst autocorrelation ρ1 of detrended,
seasonally-adjusted dividends, deﬂated by US CPI; 1977:1-2000:3.
Preliminary speciﬁcation analysis of the dynamic behavior of dividends reveals two
features. First, the autocorrelation function switches from positive to negative values
after three to four quarters. Second, while the ﬁrst two partial autocorrelation coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant for all countries except Canada, all countries exhibit several signiﬁcant
partial autocorrelation coeﬃcients beyond the ﬁrst two. To accommodate both properties
in a parsimonious way we follow the system (2)-(5) above, and decompose dividends into
a persistent cyclical component, captured by an AR(2) process, and a transitory shock:
















t are uncorrelated i.i.d. sequences of shocks with zero mean and standard
deviations σεD and σεFD, respectively. Here FD
t captures the oscillatory behavior of the
correlogram that is typical of variables aﬀected by the business cycle. The presence of
the transitory noise εD
t that cannot be distinguished from the underlying business cycle
movement implies that lags longer than two are still helpful in forecasting dividends.
To estimate this process, we use the fact that it permits an ARMA(2,2) representation
¡








Dt−2 − ¯ D
¢
+ ut + λ1ut−1 + λ2ut−2,
where ut is an i.i.d. sequence of shocks with standard deviation σu, and where the
parameters satisfy a set of nonlinear constraints. Details of the estimation procedure are
contained in the Appendix, where we also provide expressions for σεD and σεFD in terms
of the ARMA(2,2) parameters. Table 2 lists the estimation results together with some
properties of the estimated dividend process.
24Table 2. Estimated Dividend Process.







CAN 1.859 −0.896 0.036 0.073 0.409 0.88 1.04±0.20i −0.002
FRA 1.369 −0.420 0.110 0.026 0.458 0.39 1.11;2.15 0.327
GER 1.734 −0.773 0.143 0.183 1.095 0.75 1.12±0.19i 0.217
ITA 1.685 −0.708 0.031 0.170 0.272 0.70 1.12;1.26 0.454
JAP 1.212 −0.275 0.783 0.031 2.988 0.24 1.10;3.30 0.248
UK 1.223 −0.294 0.572 0.031 2.403 0.26 1.12;3.04 0.252
US 1.679 −0.747 0.698 0.818 3.836 0.71 1.12±0.28i 0.088
NOTES: Roots are computed for the autoregressive polynomial of FD
t .
The persistent component FD
t is stationary: the roots of the autoregressive polynomial
are outside the unit circle. In most countries, the roots are complex, which accounts for
oscillations in the correlogram. In addition, the persistent component has persistent











For all countries, we have that 0 < (−a2) < 1 and that (1 − a1 − a2) is a small positive
number. After a shock hits, two counteracting eﬀects are at work. First, any change in
a certain direction leads to more changes in the same direction, although at a decreasing
rate since (−a2) < 1.I ft h i s w a s t h e o n l y e ﬀect, the level FD
t would be nonstationary.
However, the second term causes mean reversion in the level by pulling FD
t towards its
mean of zero whenever it is positive, and by pulling it up when it is negative. For the
impulse response of the level, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates early on, before the second eﬀect
takes over. The result is a hump-shaped impulse response function.
Because it is so persistent, the persistent component explains almost all the variation
in dividends: its share of total variance is larger than 96% for all countries except Italy.
For 3 of the 7 countries, the volatilities of the shocks hitting the persistent component in
any given quarter is also higher than that of transitory shocks. Still, changes in dividends
are typically less persistent than changes in the persistent component. Changes in div-
idends can be decomposed into changes in FD
t , which are positively serially correlated,
and changes in the temporary component, which are negatively serially correlated and
thus reduce overall persistence.
255.2 Equity Flows
5.2.1 Data Sources
We obtain data on the international equity ﬂows of US investors from the Treasury In-
ternational Capital (TIC) reporting system of the US Treasury.14 Financial institutions
(banks, bank holding companies, securities brokers, dealers, and non-banking enterprises)
must report to the Treasury, each month, by country, on all of their transactions with
foreigners in long-term securities (e.g. stocks and bonds) by country if their aggregate
purchases or sales total more than US $2 million in the month. As a result, the Treasury
receives comprehensive data on cross-border equity transactions for most US investors.
The Treasury collects data by geographic center and not by the country of origin of the
security. This means that the data can be unrepresentative for countries that contain
large international ﬁnancial centers such as the UK. Warnock and Cleaver (2002) examine
the TIC data in detail and ﬁnd that transactions to the UK are overstated while transac-
tions to other countries are understated. The typical example of this is the purchase by
US investors of stock from, say, an Italian company issuing securities in the Euro-equity
market through banks in London, which is recorded as a sale of UK equity.
D a t ao nt h ev o l u m eo ft r a d i n ga r ef r o mD a t a s t r e a m ’ sG l o b a lE q u i t yI n d i c e sa n dg i v e s
the aggregation of the number of shares traded multiplied by the closing price for each
stock. Finally, we obtain data on equity holdings from the Report on US Holdings of
Foreign Long-Term Securities, issued jointly by the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve
Board. The report is based on TIC data and the 1997 benchmark survey of US investors.
5.2.2 Matching Model and Data Flows
Both ﬂow and volume data record sums over all transactions in a given month or quarter;
the TIC database does not provide guidance on which days, and hence at what prices, the
transactions took place. In contrast, our discrete time model makes predictions about
holdings at a point in time. To match model-implied changes in holdings to ﬂow data,
we need to normalize the latter. One convenient way to do this is to divide ﬂows by
total market capitalization at the beginning of the period. To see why this makes sense,
suppose that there are n dates between t and t +1at which transactions are recorded.




t−1 in US investors’ holdings that takes
p l a c ea td a t eti (with θ
∗
t measured as a fraction of outstanding shares). Then normalized
14There are a number of related studies that use the same data set (Tesar and Werner 1993, 1995;
Bohn and Tesar 1996a,b; Brennan and Cao 1997; Albuquerque et al. 2003). See Froot et al. (2001) and
Levich (1994) for a description of limitations/advantages of US Treasury data.



























where ˜ Pt is the undetrended local stock price. (The appendix shows that this normaliza-
tion is consistent with exponential detrending of dividend levels.)
Normalized ﬂows are thus equal to the change in holdings multiplied by a weighted
average of within-month capital gains. In what follows, we match normalized net ﬂows




t−1). This match is exact if all transactions take place on the
ﬁr s td a yo ft h em o n t h ,t h a ti s ,t1 = t, x1 =1and xi =0for i>1. Some evidence on
the importance of the resulting bias can be obtained by comparing results to the polar
opposite case, when ﬂows are normalized by the end-of-period market capitalization (i.e.
tn = t +1and xn =1 ). In terms of our stylized facts, this change somewhat reduces
both the contemporaneous correlation of ﬂows and returns and the persistence of ﬂows,
but the eﬀect is on the order of a few percentage points for all countries. We conclude
that the normalization is reasonable.
It is well known that turnover (that is, the ratio of trading volume to market capital-
ization), exhibits an increasing trend. Not surprisingly, the same is true for gross ﬂows
to and from all our countries, after they have been normalized by market capitalization.
Our model does not allow for this type of trend in trading activity: equilibrium holdings,
and hence their diﬀerences, are stationary. However, this need not aﬀect the model’s
relevance for stylized facts about net ﬂows. Indeed, it is plausible that much of the trend
in trading activity is due to features of the trading process that have been simpliﬁed
away in the model, but that are not germane to the behavior of net ﬂows.15
Of course, if our model is correct, not all of the gross ﬂows are unrelated to net
ﬂow movements. In our calibration, we thus insist on obtaining moments for our model-
implied stationary turnover series that are in the ballpark of values observed in the data.
In particular, we calibrate the expected value of turnover to the average turnover over the
15First, the actual population of US investors does not consist of long-lived agents that do not have
any idiosyncratic liquidity needs. Trades due to ﬁnite investment horizons or other liquidity reasons
need not aﬀect net ﬂows as long as they average out across investors. They will, however, be recorded
as gross ﬂows and volume. Since their frequency is arguably increasing with the increase in market
participation, this might account for the trend in the gross measures. A second candidate reason for
trends is rebalancing across diﬀerent securities. We assume throughout that there is a single (index)
security that all investors hold. In fact, there are many stocks, and agents who hold an index rebalance
as market weights change. Rebalancing does not add to net ﬂows, but it is recorded as gross ﬂows. It is
also likely more frequent as share repurchases and issues have become more common in recent years.
27years 1995-2000. We then compare other model moments to similar long-run averages
from the data.
5.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3a presents summary statistics for net purchases of stocks abroad by US investors
as well as excess returns on domestic indices for the countries we consider. The mean
excess returns in this table are based on detrended data, which means that the eﬀects of
dividend growth are already removed. This explains why excess returns are smaller than
the mean equity premia usually reported from raw data and why Sharpe ratios implied
by the table are unusually low. In our set of countries, changes in American investors’
holdings are small relative to total market capitalization. Within a given quarter, it is
rare to see a change in position of more than one percent of market capitalization.
Table 3a. excess returns and net-flows.







µ(NF∗) σ(NF∗) ρ1 (NF∗) ρ(RD,NF∗)
CAN 1.4 8.1 0.17 0.37 0.52 0.27
FRA 1.5 11.7 0.15 0.28 0.46 0.17
GER 0.7 9.8 0.03 0.14 0.35 0.28
ITA 0.9 15.0 0.05 0.31 0.16 0.13
JAP 0.8 13.0 0.05 0.13 0.45 0.40
UK 0.8 9.3 0.12 0.24 0.51 0.16
US 1.9 7.4 — — — —
NOTES: Means µ, standard deviations σ and ﬁrst autocorrelations ρ1 for Excess
Returns (log quarterly US$ returns min u s3 - m o n t hT - b i l lr a t e )a n dN e tI n ﬂows (net




is the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcient of
Excess Returns and Net Inﬂows. Quarterly data, 1977:2-2000:3.
The table documents two key stylized facts about the joint distribution of net inﬂows
and excess returns. First, net inﬂows are persistent. The ﬁrst autocorrelation coeﬃcient
ranges between .16 for Switzerland to .52 for Canada. In all countries but Italy, it
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The persistence of net inﬂo w si sn o td u e
to trends. Figure 1 plots the net inﬂow series for all our countries. It is apparent
that the main feature is slow transitions from periods of high to low net inﬂows.16 For
16It is notable that for some countries, such as Germany and Italy, there is a marked change in volatility
between the late 70s and early 80s and more recent years. This reﬂe c t sa ni n c r e a s ei no v e r a l lt r a d i n g
activity. However, this eﬀect does not induce a trend in the mean of net inﬂows.
28example, American investors were pulling money out of the French stock market in the
late 1970s and reinvested it there again in the mid-1980s. They did essentially the
converse in the Netherlands: positions that were built slowly over the late 70s and early
80s were unwound between 1983 and 1986. The second fact is that the contemporaneous
correlation between domestic excess stock returns (measured in US dollars) and net
inﬂows from the US is strongly positive.
Table 3b collects summary statistics for holdings, gross ﬂows and volume. US investors
hold signiﬁcant fractions of the market in all of our countries except Italy. Gross purchases
and sales are of the same order of magnitude in all the countries. The stylized fact that
gross sales and purchases are highly positively correlated holds both in the time series for
every countries and in the cross section of countries. Importantly, the time series results
do not only reﬂect trend behavior. While there are trends in gross ﬂows over the whole
sample, behavior over a ﬁve year period is mostly driven by volatility that is common
to both series. Figure 2 illustrates this for the countries in our sample. Finally, volume,
measured here by the value of all trades divided by market capitalization, varies widely
across countries. However, it is interesting that holdings of US investors appear to turn
over less frequently than holdings of other investors within the country. This is true for
all but two of our countries, Canada and the UK being the exceptions. This fact will be
of interest in our calibration below.
Table 3b. Holdings, Turnover and Gross Flows.
US Holdings (%) Volume (%) Gross Flows (%)
h∗ µ(VOL ) σ(VOL ) µ(GP∗) µ(GS∗) ρ(GP ∗,GS∗)
CAN 14.3 14.1 2.7 3.2 3.0 0.97
FRA 12.7 16.0 3.4 0.9 0.9 0.62
GER 9.9 51.6 13.2 1.0 1.0 0.87
ITA 1.1 86.2 35.1 0.8 0.8 0.60
JAP 39.0 4.8 2.7 0.9 0.8 0.91
UK 12.4 3.9 2.1 4.5 4.5 0.95
NOTES: US holdings are a fraction of local market capitalization, as of 12/31/1999.
Volume is total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization. Gross
purchases (GP) and gross sales (GS) are divided by market capitalization. All
gross ﬂow and volume statistics are averages over 1995:1-2000:3.
296 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst describe how we calibrate the model to dividend and ﬂow data.
The procedure outlined in Subsection 6.1 applies to all countries in our sample. We
then provide some further model statistics not used in the calibration and compare them
to the data. Finally, we use structural impulse responses and variance decomposition
analysis to interpret our ﬁndings.
6.1 Calibration
Preferences
One period in the model corresponds to one quarter. We choose an annual discount
rate of 4 percent, that is, β =0 .9901.T h ec o e ﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is set to
γ =1 0 .
Investment Opportunities
Local dividends and world asset returns are taken directly from the data. For divi-
dends, we use the detrended process estimated in Subsection 5.1. From (4), we assume
that the world return is unpredictable and uncorrelated with local dividends. Its mean
and standard deviation are matched to the US stock market return: ¯ RW =0 .0187 and
σW =0 .074.
It is diﬃcult to construct an observable counterpart of the returns on private in-
vestment opportunities. Our strategy is to ﬁrst impose a number of a priori plausible
restrictions that give rise to a two-parameter family of processes, with the free parameters
ηD and ηB introduced in (3). We then ﬁx the remaining parameters to match selected
moments on stock market trading activity. We impose throughout that the unconditional
m e a na n dv a r i a n c eo fp r i v a t er e t u r n sa r et h es a m ea st h o s eo ft h er e t u r no nt h ew o r l d
asset. In addition, we allow for three speciﬁc features of private returns.
First, private returns can be predictable. Predictability has been documented in
many securities markets and it is certainly prevalent for non-traded assets, where returns
need not be competed away quickly. Second, both the predictable and the unpredictable
component of returns may be correlated with the local business cycle. In our model, the
latter is captured by dividends. Third, there may be persistent factors other than the
local business cycle that aﬀect expected private returns. This feature is of interest since
some opportunities chased by sophisticated investors active in the local markets may in
fact be located in other countries.
30A c c o r d i n gt o( 3 ) ,t h eﬁrst component of private expected returns is proportional to
the persistent component of local dividends FD
t . The second component is driven by a
process FB
t that is independent of FD
t and also has an AR(2) structure. We impose that it
captures oscillations at business-cycle frequencies by setting the AR(2) parameters equal
to those of the persistent component in US dividends. As a normalization, the variance
of shocks to FB
t is set equal to that of FD
t . The overall volatility of expected returns and
the relative importance of the local business cycle is then governed by the parameters ηD
and ηZ.
In our baseline calibration, we also ﬁx ρ
¡
εB,ε D¢
= .5 and σ2
y = .1. Sensitivity analysis
has shown that the performance of the model does not depend strongly on these values.
Once they are ﬁxed, and given values for ηD and ηZ, the variance of unexpected returns
σ2
εB must be chosen to ensure that the unconditional variance of private returns matches
that of the world asset return. Our speciﬁcation of investment opportunities thus leaves
two degrees of freedom that can be used to match statistics of trading activity.17
Matching Flow Moments
I nt o t a l ,w ea r el e f tt oc h o o s eﬁve parameters: the fractions νU, ν∗ and ν∗
U that govern
the composition of the investor population and the numbers ηD and ηB that govern the
volatility and business cycle correlation of private returns. We select these parameters in
order to best match ﬁve moments of trading activity: mean volume, mean local holdings
and mean gross purchases by US investors as well as the standard deviation and the
ﬁrst autocorrelation of net purchases by US investors. In addition, we use the positive
sign of the contemporaneous correlation of US net purchases and returns to provide
guidance on which type of investors is more prevalent in the US investor population. The
relevant model statistics are deﬁned in Subsection 4.4 and their observable counterparts
are explained in Subsection 5.2.
Table 4 lists the parameter values of the baseline calibration for all countries together
with data and model values of the target moments. By and large, the target moments
are matched tightly, although the model understates mean volume in Germany, Japan,
Italy and the UK. The parameter values for the expected oﬀ-market return process are
similar across countries. The business cycle component is most important in Italy, the
country where the persistent component accounts for less of the dividend variance (cf.
Table 2). In contrast, the oﬀ-market factor FB
t plays a larger role in driving private
returns available to investors in the Canadian stock market. This is needed in order to
17This assumption is not really restrictive, since FB
t is not directly linked to observables. It could
simply be interpreted as sophisticated investors’ perceived expected returns.
31increase trading volume (see 19).
For Japan, Italy and U.K., the model generates small volatility of unsophisticated in-
vestors’ ﬂows, which brings down the volatility of trading (see Subsection 4.4). Nonethe-
less, the model can still match the volatility of US investors’ ﬂo w sa sl o n gν∗
U is suﬃciently
larger than νU (see (20)). For Germany the model generates average trading volume com-
parable with other countries, but the data indicates much larger volume. In contrast,
the model performs well in predicting mean gross purchases in these markets. The lone
exception is the UK: this may be due to the UK being a large international ﬁnancial
center (see Levich 1994).
With the exception of Japan and the U.K., the average international US investor
is sophisticated: ν∗
U < 0.5. However, for all countries νU <ν ∗
U, meaning that the
average US international investor is less sophisticated than the average local investor.
Being relatively less sophisticated means that aggregate net ﬂo w so fU Si n v e s t o r sa r e
proportional to unsophisticated investors’ net ﬂows (see 20). This fact is consistent
with the view that US investors have worse private information than local investors,
usually associated with the existence of a home bias. Importantly, Table 4 indicates
that cross-country heterogeneity observed in the diﬀerence νU − ν∗
U is not as signiﬁcant
as within-country heterogeneity measured by νU − 0.5. Trading is thus not motivated
by diﬀerences in population across countries, but by diﬀerences in investor populations
within countries as would be expected in G7 economies.
32Table 4. Parameters and Calibrated Moments
France Canada Germany U.K. Japan Italy
Parameters
Private Returns ηD ηB ηD ηB ηD ηB ηD ηB ηD ηB ηD ηB
0.085 0.087 0.070 0.294 0.045 0.054 1e-4 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.110 0.120
# Unsophisticated νU νU νU νU νU νU
0.40 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.80 0.01







0.124 0.43 0.14 0.41 0.10 0.37 0.12 0.80 0.39 0.84 0.01 0.40
Moments Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
µ(θ
∗) in % 12.7 12.7 14.3 14.3 9.9 9.9 12.4 12.4 39.0 39.0 1.1 1.1
σ (∆θ
∗) in % 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.37 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.13 0.31 0.31
ρ1 (∆θ
∗) 0.46 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.35 035 0.51 0.32 0.45 0.25 0.16 0.16
µ(VOL ) in % 16.9 16.7 14.1 14.1 51.6 12.3 3.9 0.95 4.8 1.0 86.2 1.0
µ(GP ∗) in % 0.9 2.1 3.2 2.0 1.0 1.2 4.5 0.13 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.13
336.2 Further Predictions for Flows and Returns









) was directly used to calibrate the model. Table 5 reports
further data and model statistics not used in the calibration relevant to the other stylized
facts. In addition, Figures 3 and 4 present graphs of the entire cross-correlogram of
returns and ﬂows and the autocorrelogram of ﬂo w sf o rt h es i xc o u n t r i e si no u rs a m p l e .
Simultaneous Buying and Selling
The model produces high positive contemporaneous correlation between gross pur-
chases and gross sales. Gross trading activity of US investors thus occurs in bursts of
simultaneous buying and selling. The fact that we overpredict these bursts of trading
could be due to transitory idiosyncratic shocks that are recorded as gross ﬂows. The UK
and Italy are the only two countries for which the model predicts a negative correlation
between purchases and sales of local stocks by US investors.
Flow Continuation and Flow Reversal
The ﬁrst column in Figures 3 and 4 presents the autocorrelogram of US investors’
net purchases (equivalently, that of unsophisticated investors’ net purchases) with 90%
conﬁdence bands computed with Newey-West errors. It is remarkable how well the model
captures the J-curve pattern evident in the data. The J-curve pattern displays ﬂow
continuation up to 3 (and sometimes 4) lags and ﬂow reversal at lags 5 and 6. The data
further displays a cyclical pattern with the ﬂow correlations increasing again after lag
6. This is also captured in the model—as a virtue of the AR(2) processes estimated for
dividends—though at longer horizons. Only the U.K. and Japan display signiﬁcantly more
persistence in the short run in the data than in the model.
Return Chasing
Return chasing behavior is apparent both from Table 5 and from the cross-correlograms
in the second column of Figures 3 and 4. The model somewhat overpredicts the con-
temporaneous correlation of returns and net purchases for France, the U.K. and Italy,
while the performance for Canada, Germany and Japan is quite satisfactory. Moreover,
the model captures the tent-shape curve around the contemporaneous correlation dis-
played in the data. The model matches well the signiﬁcant return chasing in France and
Germany, and the absence thereof in Italy. It misses the correlation of lagged returns
and current ﬂows for the U.K., Canada and Japan. However, it captures the qualitative
34feature of cyclicality in the correlation of lagged returns and ﬂows: low and negative at
2 and 3 lags, and increasing after lags 4 or 5.
The model also generates positive correlation between net purchases by US investors








> 0.T h i si sc o n s i s -
tent with evidence presented by Bohn and Tesar (1996) for our set of countries. These
authors estimate expected returns using a comprehensive set of instruments that proxies
the public information set. They then show that US investors move into a market when
their ﬁtted expected returns are high.
Other Statistics
The value of µ(VOL ) was calibrated to the data which means that in our model
σ(VOL )=.7(5) × µ(VOL ). The model predicts that µ(VOL ) >σ (VOL ) which is
robust across all countries. The exact quantitative performance of the model varies
considerably across countries. The model does well for Germany, but overpredicts the
volatility of trading volume by a factor of 3 for France and Canada. The model sig-
niﬁcantly underpredicts volatility in trading volume for Italy (see Table 4). With the
exception of Japan, current ﬂows predict one quarter ahead returns both in the data and
in the model. For Japan, both the data and the model display a negative correlation
between ﬂows and future returns.
Finally, the model exhibits both an equity premium puzzle and a volatility puzzle for
price levels (not documented), two common weaknesses of macroeconomic asset pricing
models discussed in detail by Campbell (2001). These results are not entirely surprising,
since, for technical reasons, our model features constant discount rates. The frictions we
introduce thus cannot produce highly ampliﬁed eﬀects on price levels.
35T a b l e5 .N o n - c a l i b r a t e dM o m e n t s
France Canada Germany U.K. Japan Italy















+ 0.15 + 0.17 + 0.20 + 0.21 + 0.26 + 0.20
σ (VOL t) in % 3.1 12.6 2.7 10.7 13.2 9.3 2.1 0.7 2.7 0.8 35.1 0.8
ρ(GP ∗
t ,GS∗
t ) 0.63 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.99 0.95 -0.17 0.91 0.89 0.60 -0.44







was taken from Table 2 in Bohn and Tesar (1996).
366.3 Interpretation
To provide intuition for our numerical results, we now discuss the role of various structural
shocks in generating the stylized facts we are interested in. As a representative example,
we focus on the French stock market.
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition
An impulse response function describes the dynamic response of equilibrium prices
a n dt r a d e st oao n e - t i m es t r u c t u r a ls h o c k . W en o r m a l i z et h es i z eo ft h es h o c kt oo n e
standard deviation. Impulse response functions are easily calculated from the model’s sta-
tionary vector autoregressive representation.18 Figures 5-7 respectively plot the model’s
response to an innovation to the persistent component of local dividends (the “business
cycle shock” εFD
t ), to a transitory shock to dividends εD
t a n dt oa ni n n o v a t i o nt ot h eo ﬀ-
market factor εFB
t .E a c hﬁgure displays information on the following group of variables:
the local stock price Pt, the forecast errors on the business cycle by both investor types,
FD
t − ˆ FDS
t and FD
t − ˆ FDU
t (plotted together in the second graph of the ﬁrst row), the
local per-dollar stock return, unsophisticated investors’ net purchases and conditional
one-quarter-ahead forecasts of the local stock return.
Not all of the structural shocks discussed above are equally important for a given
model statistic. To quantify the role of the diﬀerent shocks, we provide variance decom-
positions of key second moments. Figure 8 plots the contribution of every shock to the
covariance of unsophisticated investors’ ﬂows and returns, the covariance of unsophis-
ticated investors’ current and lagged ﬂows, the covariance of unsophisticated investors’
ﬂows and their expected returns (the return chasing eﬀect) and the covariance of current
and lagged stock returns. We omit the shocks to sophisticated investors’ private signal
and to transitory oﬀ-market returns as they have a minimal direct contribution to these
moments.
Return Chasing and the Business Cycle
Persistent local business cycle shocks induce return chasing. The variance decompo-
sitions show that εFD
t accounts for most of the correlation of ﬂows with both current
and past returns. While temporary dividend shocks contribute to the contemporaneous










¢0.I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that the vector xt has a ﬁrst-order vector
autoregressive representation where the errors are the economy’s structural shocks and that this charac-
terization of xt fully describes the equilibrium of the model. Any variable in the economy, such as asset
holdings and ﬂows or realized and expected returns, can be easily constructed from xt.
37to the oﬀ-market factor are largely irrelevant for return chasing.
The impulse response to a positive innovation εFD
t is shown in Figure 5. On impact,
prices increase in response to higher current dividends and future expected payouts.
Unsophisticated investors observe these public signals. They underreact to the shock
since they cannot be sure that FD
t has actually moved. Sophisticated investors underreact
by less as they have more signals to rely on. Disagreement trading by itself would thus
lead the more optimistic sophisticated investors to buy shares. However, improved private
opportunities also trigger risk sharing trades. Both the myopic and the hedging demand
of sophisticated investors decrease as they try to get rid of tradable business cycle risk.
Overall, the risk sharing eﬀect dominates: sophisticated investors sell the domestic stock
market as prices rise, which contributes to positive contemporaneous correlation of net
purchases and returns.
The high stock return that obtains on impact is followed by further net purchases
by unsophisticated investors, before reversal sets in. In fact, for about three quarters
after the impact eﬀect, disagreement and risk sharing trades go in the same direction,
generating pronounced return chasing. On the one hand, disagreement is reduced as
unsophisticated investors learn the nature of the shock. This encourages them to buy.
On the other hand, business cycle momentum creates more private opportunities. So-
phisticated investors’ incentive to sell shares thus also increases, at least in the short
run. After about three quarters, reversal sets in. The disagreement eﬀect weakens as
unsophisticated have learned the nature of the shock. At the same time, the return on
private opportunities begins to revert to the mean. As a result, sophisticated investors
return to the stock market. Importantly, both return chasing and the eventual reversal
are predictable consequences of the initial shock (and concomitant high return). This
eﬀect thus explains the observed oscillations in the cross-correlogram.
Transitory shock to dividends contribute only to contemporaneous correlation of ﬂows
and returns. In response to such a shock (shown in Figure 6), both types of investors see
dividends increase and assign positive probability to the shock being persistent. However,
unsophisticated investors become more optimistic than sophisticated investors because
they have fewer signals about the persistent component FD
t . They expect a continuation
of high prices and future positive returns and buy the local stock market. In contrast,
sophisticated investors are less optimistic and sell the local stock market. The impact
eﬀect of the shock induces a positive correlation between unsophisticated investor ﬂows
and returns. However, after the impact, trades driven by a transitory shock are quickly
reversed as investors correct their forecast errors. Too large a contribution from these
38shocks would thus prevent the model from matching the positive correlation of net pur-
chases with lagged returns.
Flow Momentum, Reversal and Risk Sharing
The autocorrelation of ﬂows is mainly driven by both business cycle shocks and shocks
to the oﬀ-market factor. For both types of shock the major motive of trade is risk sharing:
as oﬀ-market opportunities improve, sophisticated investors try to shed tradable business-
cycle risk in order to load up on nontradable risk. The impulse response of ﬂows to the
t w os h o c k si st h u ss i m i l a ri ns h a p e .
Initially, there is a fair amount of disagreement: unsophisticated investors underes-
timate the actual state of the business cycle. While this is due to underreaction after
an FD
t shock (see Figure 7), it is due to overreaction after an FB
t shock (see Figure 5).
In the latter case, unsophisticated investors only see a drop in prices, which they will
partly attribute to a downturn in the local business cycle and partly to the FB
t shock.
Since prices must fall on impact to entice unsophisticated investors to buy, the FB
t shock
contributes negatively to the contemporaneous correlation of ﬂows and returns.
Disagreement makes it costly for sophisticated investors to sell early on. However, as
the shock persists, investors learn the nature of the shock and the forecast error is re-
duced. Sophisticated investors keep leaving the stock market, generating persistent ﬂows.
Importantly, only persistent shocks are able to generate persistence in ﬂows and returns.
Transitory shocks to dividends produce very quick reversals of ﬂows that translate into
negatively serially correlated ﬂows. This constrains the model’s ability to generate the
observed trading patterns: calibrations that create a bigger role for transitory shocks








worsen the model’s performance in terms of ﬂow persistence.
39Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix we provide the complete proof of Theorem 1 in the main text. In the
equilibrium that we analyze, the local equity asset price depends on factor realizations
and beliefs of unsophisticated investors on these factors:










t deﬁned in the text gives the vector of unsophisticated investors’ observ-
able variables, i.e., the local dividend and price and the world return. Unsophisticated
investors do not see the return on sophisticated investors’ private opportunities. Applying
the Kalman ﬁlter on unsophisticated investors’ problem yields:
























We can now construct unsophisticated investors’ state vector φ
U
t = ˆ FU
t and use (22)






























Let us turn to the decision problem of both investors. Write returns as
R
i
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= ψ + Ψφt,
w h e r et h em a t r i c e sa r eg i v e nb yM
ψ0
= ¯ R0−u0MφεΩM
Rεφ0, Mφψ0 = MRφ0−Φ0UM
φεΩM
Rεφ0,
and Mψψ = MRεφΩM
Rεφ0.T h eﬁrst term (i.e., ˜ γ−1 ¡
Mψψ¢−1 MRφ)i nm a t r i xΨ gives the
myopic demand of the investor whereas the second term (i.e., -˜ γ−1 ¡
Mψψ¢−1 MRεφΩMφε0UΦ)
gives the hedging demand of the investor.







we see that risk averse investors not only care
about ﬂuctuations in wealth, but also about changes in beliefs, captured by the state
vector φ
i
t.T h eq u a d r a t i ct e r mr e ﬂects investors’ taste for ‘unusual’ investment opportu-
nities. Intuition for this eﬀect can be obtained by thinking about the case of one state
variable. Ui is then a positive number and continuation utility is higher the further φ
i
t
is from its mean of zero. Since φ
i
t is payoﬀ relevant, it drives expected returns at some
time in the future. An unusual value signals that above average expected returns will be
available, by either going long or short.














































































MRφi0 is a transformation of




u s et h i sd e c o m p o s i t i o ni nt h em a i nt e x t .
41Solving for the optimal consumption level and the value function we get that for given



































































Finally, to solve for an equilibrium let ΘS
ˆ FS b et h ep a r to ft h eﬁrst row of ΨS that is
associated with ˆ FS
t , ΘU be the ﬁrst row of ΨU and ¯ θ
i be the mean local asset demand
by investor i. In equilibrium we require that
∆¯ θ
U +( 1− ∆)¯ θ
S =1 ,
∆Θ
U +( 1− ∆)Θ
S
ˆ F = 0.
BD e t r e n d i n g
Data on dividends and ﬂows exhibit trends, while our quantitative exercise explores a
detrended economy. We now outline a consistent approach to detrending dividends and
ﬂows. To ﬁx ideas, consider the following stylized view of the stock market. There are N
ﬁrms, each with a single share, paying the same (per-share) dividend ˜ Dt and having the
same (per-share) price ˜ Pt. Dividends grow at an exponential rate η. The parameter η
thus captures trend ﬁrm productivity growth, which beneﬁts owners through dividends.
An observed aggregate price index records the change in the value of the average
ﬁrm, ˜ Pt/ ˜ Pt−1. This change in valuation has two components: capital gains that arise
from ﬂuctuations in the ﬁrm’s stationary price Pt/Pt−1 and the growth in prices built in
from productivity growth:
˜ Pt/ ˜ Pt−1 = e
ηPt/Pt−1.
The observed dividend yield is δt = ˜ Dt/ ˜ Pt = Dt/Pt. A natural way to remove the
trend from dividends is to exponentially detrend the measure δt ˜ Pt. The observed holdings
of the domestic equity index by investor i are ˜ Pt˜ θ
i
t. The observed market capitalization
42at the end of period t is the combined value of all plants, ˜ Mt = ˜ PtN. The normalization
of holdings by beginning-of-period market capitalization is thus a natural way to remove














There is an explicit connection between dividends and equilibrium holdings before
and after detrending. We can summarize an economy driven by trending exogenous
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. Suppose that ˜ Dt = eηtDt and that
³
˜ Pt,˜ θt, ˜ ψ
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is an equilibrium of E, where we suppress the indices for the diﬀerent





























In our quantitative exercise, we consider a detrended economy. We determine a
stationary dividend process Dt as the residuals in a regression of average ﬁrm dividends





= E [logDt]+ηt+( l o gDt − E [logDt]). (25)
We then match the equilibrium ﬂows to observed ﬂows normalized by market capitaliza-
tion. In the light of the above result, this ensures consistent detrending of dividends and
ﬂows.
We also need to select an interest rate Rf and a return process RW
t for the detrended
economy. Here we use the observed average interest rate and US stock return. In terms
of the above notation, we are thus analyzing the economy E0. Given our data, this
is preferable to considering the economy Eˆ η where ˆ η is the growth rate estimate from
(25). The reason is that, in a small sample such as ours, ˆ η is driven by medium term
developments and does not reﬂect the long run average growth rate. In particular, in
our sample ˆ η exceeds the average real riskless interest rate. We are thus not likely to
learn much by considering equilibrium ﬂows from Eˆ η. At the same time, the result of
the previous paragraph shows that the only role of the trend growth rate η is to shift all
returns. This suggests that the behavior of the correlations we are interested in will be
similar across all economies Eη for η reasonably small.
43C The Dividend Process
In this section, we ﬁll in the details of how we estimate the dividend process. We derive
conditions under which a general ARMA(2,2) process permits a representation of the

















t are serially uncorrelated and independent random variables with zero
mean and variances σ2
εFD and σ2
εD, respectively. To prove our result we need to compare
the correlogram of dividends under the two representations. Consider ﬁrst the represen-
tation (26). The correlogram of the persistent component FD



































































































; s ≥ 3.
The correlogram of the dividend process is thus given by
σ
2 ¡































































as well as, for every s ≥ 3,
σ
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Dt − ¯ D,Dt−s+2 − ¯ D
¢
.
Now consider a general ARMA(2,2) process
Dt − ¯ D = a1
¡




Dt−2 − ¯ D
¢
+ ut + λ1ut−1 + λ2ut−2,
44where ut is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance σ2
u. Squaring both sides
and taking expectations, we have
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In addition, multiplying both sides by
¡
Dt−1 − ¯ D
¢
and taking expectations, we have
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and taking expectations, we obtain
σ
¡













The variance can be solved out in terms of parameters only:
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The ﬁrst and second covariances are then given by (27) and (28) and all further covari-
ances (for s ≥ 3) follow the recursion
σ
¡








Dt − ¯ D,Dt−s+2 − ¯ D
¢
.
It is clear that if a given ARMA(2,2) process is to have the representation (26), the
autoregressive coeﬃcients must be the same in both representations. Moreover, since the
recursions for all covariances beyond lag 2 are identical, a representation of the type (26)
exists if there exist σ2
εFD,σ 2
εD > 0 such that the variance and the ﬁrst two covariances are
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The ﬁrst and last equations can be used to calculate the implied values of σ2
εD and σ2
εFD
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The second equation implies the additional constraint
0=a2λ1 (1 + λ2) − a1λ2 (1 − a2). (30)
In a ﬁrst estimation step, we impose (30), but do not impose the inequality constraint.
The inequalities are not binding in all countries except for Japan and UK. For these
countries, we impose σ2
εD =0 .001, and reestimate the restricted ARMA(2,2) process.
Setting the variance of transient shocks to dividends equal to zero implies that there are
no trades based on private information as the equilibrium is fully revealing.
Table 6 below presents the estimates for the restricted ARMA(2,2) process. These
estimates are then used to produce Table 2 in the main text according to the formulas
in (29). The estimated ARMA(2,2) produces statistically signiﬁcant estimates of the
autoregressive parameters a1 and a2 most all countries (except for Japan’s a2)a n do ft h e
moving average parameters λ1 and λ2 as well (except for France and Japan). Estimates
of σ2
u are also signiﬁcant in all cases except for Canada. Finally, the constraint (30)i sn o t
rejected in 3 out of 7 countries at the usual 5% signiﬁcance level and is barely rejected
i nt h ec a s eo ft h eU S .
46Table 6. estimates of ARMA(2,2) process.
a1 a2 λ1 λ2 σ2
u χ(1)/p-value
CAN 1.859 −0.896 −1.051 0.365 0.013 4.499
6.59 −3.94 −4.23 2.91 0.78 0.033
FRA 1.369 −0.420 −0.092 0.020 0.014 5.327
33.39 −20.60 −0.64 0.62 5.42 0.020
GER 1.734 −0.773 −0.803 0.253 0.101 2.608
19.47 −8.99 −4.92 3.80 6.18 0.106
ITA 1.685 −0.708 −0.398 0.108 0.001 30.41
51.41 −32.03 −4.94 4.47 8.28 0.000
JAP 1.212 −0.275 −0.002 0.0004 0.786 2.768
4.884 −0.295 −0.815 0.272 3.141 0.096
UK 1.223 −0.294 −0.003 0.0005 0.575 2.089
16.408 −5.464 −9.349 6.125 8.212 0.148
US 1.679 −0.747 −0.754 0.237 2.100 3.846
6.60 −3.18 −2.02 1.55 9.48 0.049
NOTES: For each country, the second row gives t-statistics on the corresponding
estimates. χ(1) and p-values are given for the non-linear constraint (30).
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Figure 3: Autocorrelogram of ﬂows and cross-correlogram of returns and ﬂows: France,
Canada and Germany. Notes: ∆θ
D∗
t is net-purchases of the local asset by US investors;
RD










































































































































































Figure 4: Autocorrelogram of ﬂows and cross-correlogram of returns and ﬂows: U.K.,
Japan and Italy. Notes: ∆θ
∗
t is net-purchases of the local asset by US investors; RD
t is
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Figure 5: Impulse response function of the asymmetric information model to a persistent
business cycle shock. Notes: ∆θ
U
t is net-purchases of the local asset by unsophisticated
investors; RD
t is the current return on the local asset; Ei
tRD
t+1 is the time t expectation by
investors of type i of the time t+1return on the local asset; FD
t −Ei
tFD
t is the forecast
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Figure 6: Impulse response function of the asymmetric information model to a transient
business cycle shock. Notes: ∆θ
U
t is net-purchases of the local asset by unsophisticated
investors; RD
t is the current return on the local asset; Ei
tRD
t+1 is the time t expectation by
investors of type i of the time t+1return on the local asset; FD
t −Ei
tFD
t is the forecast





Resp. of price to ε
FB



























t  (%) to ε
FB








t  to ε
FB


















Figure 7: Impulse response function of the asymmetric information model to a persistent
oﬀ-market shock. Notes: ∆θ
U
t is net-purchases of the local asset by unsophisticated
investors; RD
t is the current return on the local asset; Ei
tRD
t+1 is the time t expectation by
investors of type i of the time t+1return on the local asset; FD
t −Ei
tFD
t is the forecast
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Figure 8: Variance decomposition in the asymmetric information model. Notes: ∆θ
U
t
is net-purchases of the local asset by unsophisticated investors; RD
t is the return on the
local asset; EU
t RD
t+1 is the time t expectation by unsophisticated investors of the time
t +1return on the local asset.